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The Concept of Judicial Independence 
 
It is almost universally acknowledged that one of the hallmarks of a 
democracy is the independence of the Judiciary.  A Judiciary which exists 
merely to do a Government's bidding or to implement Government policy 
provides no guarantee of liberty.  What do we mean by independence of the 
Judiciary?  The former Chief Justice of Tasmania, Sir Guy Green has defined 
it as "the capacity of the courts to perform their constitutional function free 
from actual or apparent interference by, and to the extent that it is 
constitutionally possible, free from actual or apparent dependence upon, any 
persons or institutions, including, in particular, the executive arm of 
government, over which they do not exercise direct control." 
The maintenance of public confidence in the impartiality of Judges is 
essential to public acceptance of the law and the legal system.  A loss of that 
public confidence can lead to instability and even a threat to the very 
existence of society.  In the late seventeenth century in England, the 
politicisation of the Judiciary and its subservience to the Crown was a 
material factor in the Revolution of 1688.   One of the complaints against 
George III recited in the American Declaration of Independence was that, 
"He has made Judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their 
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." 
There are many occasions upon which a Judge is required to decide 
what is just, what is fair or what is reasonable.  In cases of that kind, a Judge 
necessarily seeks to apply basic values representative of community values.  
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In doing so, he or she does not merely reflect public opinion, or is influenced 
by prejudice, emotion or sentiment.  The Judicial Oath requires every Judge 
to administer justice according to law, without fear or favour, affection or 
ill-will.  Parliamentary democracy and the rule of law are dependent for their 
existence on an independent Judiciary.  The partisan administration of the law 
is a denial of the rule of law.   
The recognition of the principle of the independence of the Judiciary 
does not make Judges immune from criticism.  However, only in very 
exceptional cases will charges of contempt be brought in respect of criticism 
of the Judiciary.  Nevertheless, any member of the public has the right to 
criticise in good faith in public or in private any decision by the Court or a 
Judge.  Provided there is no imputation of improper motives or any attempt to 
impair the administration of justice, anyone is entitled to make fair comment, 
even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. 
 
International Recognition of the need for Judicial Independence 
 
The need for judicial independence has now been recognised on an 
international basis.  The Asia-Pacific Region has done so by its adoption of 
the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in 
the LAWASIA Region ("The Beijing Principles").  The Beijing Principles 
reflect an agreement between the Chief Justices from a range of countries 
throughout the Asia-Pacific Region on the minimum standards necessary to 
secure judicial independence in their respective countries.  Since the early 
1980s, development of the concept of judicial independence at the 
international level, in particular by the enumeration of its key features, has 
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taken place through instruments such as the International Bar Association's 
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982) ("New Delhi 
Standards") and the United Nation's Draft Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary (1981) ("Siracusa Principles"), the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary (1985) ("Basic Principles") and Draft 
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (1989) ("Singhvi 
Declaration"). 
The Beijing Principles originated from a statement of principles 
formulated by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee and a small number 
of Chief Justices and other Judges at a meeting in Tokyo in July 1982.  
"LAWASIA" is the acronym of the Law Association of Asia and the Pacific.  
It is an association of lawyers, law teachers and Judges founded in 1966 
which is committed to the protection of human rights and the maintenance of 
the rule of law by an independent Judiciary.  It covers the same Region 
covered by the United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and 
the Pacific ("ESCAP") which reaches from Afghanistan to the Russian 
Federation, Japan and Korea and extends south to Sri Lanka and the 
Seychelles, Australia, New Zealand and the countries of the Western Pacific.  
I have been a member of LAWASIA since 1968 and Chairman of the Judicial 
Section since 1989. 
The Judicial Section has been responsible for the promotion of the 
biennial Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific, held 
contemporaneously with the general LAWASIA Conference.  These 
Conferences have been held every two years since 1985.  The First 
Conference took place in Penang, Malaysia and subsequent conferences have 
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been held in Islamabad, Pakistan 1987; Manila, Philippines 1989 and 1997; 
Perth, Australia 1991; Colombo, Sri Lanka 1993; Beijing, People's Republic 
of China 1995; and Seoul, Korea, 1999. The 10th Anniversary Conference of 
Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific is being held in Tokyo in September 
2003.   
In 1991, the Conference accepted a recommendation I made that the 
Chief Justices develop a Regional statement of the principles of the 
independence of the Judiciary.  Some years previously, the United Nations 
had published a statement of the basic principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary and recommended that more detailed statements be developed in 
the various individual UN Regions around the world.  The Asia-Pacific 
Region was the first of the United Nations Regions to attempt to develop 
such a statement.  In August 1995, at the Sixth Conference of Chief Justices 
of Asia and the Pacific in Beijing, I presented a paper entitled the Second 
Revised Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary.  After 
further amendment, all 20 Chief Justices present unanimously adopted the 
Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the 
LAWASIA Region ("The Beijing Principles").  The Chief Justices of 38 
countries in the Region have now subscribed to the Beijing Principles.  They 
have the full support of the United Nations and the United Nations 
Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary, Mr Param Cumaraswary 
who was appointed to that position by the Secretary General of the United 
Nations.  The adoption of the Beijing Principles was a remarkable 
development.  It is quite extraordinary that nations, from the two countries 
with the world's largest populations to some of the smallest countries with 
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widely different legal and political systems were able to reach a consensus on 
the minimum standards necessary to maintain judicial independence.   
There are six key aspects of the Beijing Principles.  These are the 
judicial function1, the concept of judicial independence2, judicial 
appointments3, security of tenure4, jurisdictional issues5 and resources and 
finance6.   
 
The Judicial Function 
The first key aspect of the Beijing Principles is the definition of the 
parameters of the judicial function.  An appreciation of the parameters of the 
judicial function is central to an understanding of the concept of judicial 
independence.  It is these parameters which provide the legitimate foundation 
for the set of safeguards which we call the principles of judicial 
independence.  They find expression in Article 10 of the Beijing Principles.  
Article 10 provides that the objectives and functions of the Judiciary include: 
(i) to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the Rule of 
Law; 
(ii) to promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the 
observance and the attainment of human rights within its own 
society; and  
(iii) to administer the law impartially between citizen and citizen and 
between citizen and State.   
                                        
1 Encapsulated in Article 10 of the Beijing Principles 
2 Encapsulated in Articles 3 and 4 of the Beijing Principles 
3 Encapsulated in Articles 11 and 12 of the Beijing Principles 
4 Encapsulated in Articles 18 and 21 of the Beijing Principles 
5 Encapsulated in Articles 33 and 34 of the Beijing Principles 
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These functions complement and overlap each other.  For example, it is to the 
Judiciary that the power of, and responsibility for, resolving disputes 
according to law is given.7  The natural consequence of this allocation of 
responsibility is that the judicial power must be exercised by a consistent and 
unwavering application of the Rule of Law.  It follows that the Judiciary must 
apply the Rule of Law impartially to all matters brought before it. 
 In turn, such an application of the Rule of Law tends to protect persons 
from the infringement of human rights, to the extent that they are recognised 
by the Rule of Law that applies in a particular country.  There is  room, within 
the historical and cultural context of a country, for a legitimate debate about 
the appropriate scope of human rights within that country.  However, insofar 
as those rights are recognised, the Judiciary can play an important part in 
upholding them, whenever the powerful attempt to abridge them in an ad hoc 
or arbitrary manner.  As Mr L.V. Singvi observed in his Final Report to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1985: "The strength of 
legal institutions is a form of insurance for the rule of law and for the 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for preventing the 
denial and miscarriage of justice."8 
 
 The Concept of Judicial Independence 
 The second key aspect is the concept of judicial independence itself.  
What judicial independence means is set out in Article 3 of the Beijing 
                                                                                                                      
6 Encapsulated in Articles 41 and 42 of the Beijing Principlesf 
7 The Hon Justice RD Nicholson AO, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Can they Co-exist? (1993) 
67 Australian Law Journal 404 at 410-411 
8 Singhvi, LM Final Report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1985) at n 44 
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Principles which provides that the independence of the Judiciary requires 
that: 
(i) the Judiciary shall decide matters before it in accordance with its 
impartial assessment of the facts and its understanding of the law 
without improper influences, direct or indirect, from any source; 
and 
(ii) the Judiciary has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all 
issues of a justiciable nature.   
 These first two aspects of the Beijing Principles are fundamental.  The 
subsequent provisions of the Beijing Principles constitute the machinery that 
works to maintain judicial independence, which is essential to the fulfilment 
of the judicial function.   
 
 Judicial Appointments 
 The third aspect of requirement of the Beijing Principles relates to 
judicial appointments.  If we seek from our Judges an attitude of impartiality 
and the ability and determination to enforce the Rule of Law, it is important 
that the selection process which leads to judicial appointments should be 
calculated to supply individuals of this calibre.  Articles 11 and 12 of the 
Beijing Principles provide that: 
(11) To enable the Judiciary to achieve its objectives and perform its 
functions, it is essential that Judges be chosen on the basis of proven 
competence, integrity and independence. 
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(12) The mode of appointment of Judges must be such as will ensure the 
appointment of persons who are best qualified for judicial office.  It 
must provide safeguards against improper influences being taken into 
account so that only persons of competence, integrity and 
independence are appointed. 
 In the process of appointment of Judges, it is necessary that the 
influence of the Executive should be kept to a minimum in order to reduce 
potential for improper considerations.  This also has the advantage of 
encouraging public confidence in the impartiality of appointees.  To further 
encourage such public confidence, the selection process should be open and 
formal. 
 The independence of the Judiciary, as an institution, from the 
Executive and Parliament, is commonly referred to as institutional 
independence.9  In contrast, the freedom from interference to which a Judge 
is entitled is known as individual independence.  Individual independence is 
an essential safeguard for the maintenance of impartiality.  Impartiality is the 
duty of a Judge.  The guarantee of freedom from improper influence is the 
means by which performance of that duty by all Judges can best be 
achieved.10 
 
 Security of Tenure 
                                        
9 The Hon Justice RD Nicholson, n 7, p 405 
10 The Hon Justice MD Kirby, The Abolition of Courts and Non-reappointment of Judicial Officers in 
Australia (1994) at 3 
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 Security of tenure is one of the most important aspects of individual 
independence and is the fourth key aspect of the Beijing Principles.  Without 
a guarantee of tenure, subject to the proper performance of his or her judicial 
function, there is no guarantee that the fear of losing his  or her appointment 
will not, even subconsciously, influence the decision of a Judge, thereby 
infringing the principle of judicial impartiality and diminishing the rule of 
law.  Holding an appointment at the pleasure of the Executive can do 
irreparable damage to both the appearance, and fact, of impartial decision 
making.  In contrast, tenure promotes both the appearance, and the fact, of 
impartiality, because it: "…insulates Judges from the need to worry about 
political reaction to their decisions."11 
 The need for security of tenure finds expression in Articles 18 and 21 
of the Beijing Principles which provide that: 
(18)  Judges must have security of tenure. 
(21)  A Judge's tenure must not be altered to the disadvantage of a 
Judge during his or her term of office. 
Due recognition is given to national differences which incorporate 
confirmation procedures for tenure.12  However, recognition is also given to 
the ideal of judicial appointments which, in the ordinary course, only 
terminate upon the attainment of a set age.13 
 Inevitably, there will be occasions upon which the Executive has an 
apparently legitimate claim to the termination of a judicial appointment, 
                                        
11 Dieng, A., The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary: An Overview of Principles (1992) 1 
CIJL Yearbook 21 at p 29 
12 See Beijing Principles Article 19 
13 See Beijing Principles Article 20 
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because of a failure to carry out the judicial function.14  In these cases, it is 
vital that the processes adopted to test such a claim are carefully handled.  As 
a minimum, the process for removal should incorporate a thorough and 
impartial investigation of the reasons put forward for removal, as is suggested 
in Article 25 of the Beijing Principles.  Provision should be made for the 
appointment by Parliament of an independent tribunal of inquiry to inquire 
into any allegation of misbehaviour and make recommendations to the 
Parliament thereon.  As Article 26 of the Beijing Principles states, there 
should be a right to a fair hearing, and in accordance with Article 27 of those 
Principles, there should be a judgment which is based on established 
standards of judicial conduct. 
 A related issue is the non-reappointment of a Judge upon the abolition 
of the court of which he or she was a member.  This, as has been pointed out 
by  Justice Kirby, has the potential to damage judicial independence because, 
"if judicial officers are repeatedly removed from their offices, and not 
afforded equivalent or higher appointments, the inference must be drawn that 
their tenure is, effectively, at the will of the Executive."15  This result could be 
avoided if, upon abolition of a court, the Judges of the former court are  
appointed to the new court, or offered an equivalent appointment or full 
compensation.  Article 29 of the Beijing Principles provides for this.   
 Articles 31 and 32 of the Beijing Principles relate to the conditions of 
judicial service.  Judges must be provided with adequate and secure 
remuneration.  It is important for judicial remuneration to be commensurate 
                                        
14 See Beijing Principles Article 22 
15 The Hon Justice M.D. Kirby, The Abolition of Courts and Non-reappointment of Judicial Officers in 
Australia (1994) at p.3 
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with the office of a Judge.  First, it assists to attract suitable persons capable 
of meeting the exacting demands of judicial office.  Secondly, it minimises 
the potential for litigants to exercise financial influence over the decision 
making process.  Thirdly, it promotes institutional independence by 
contributing to the status of the Judiciary as an institution. 
As Article 31 of the Beijing Principles stipulates that remuneration 
should be secure, in the sense that it may not be reduced or otherwise altered 
to the detriment of a Judge during the term of office.  A Judge who faces the 
possibility of financial disadvantage if his or her decisions displease the 
Executive is not placed in a position from which it is easy to exercise the 
judicial function with true impartiality.   
 A legitimate exception to this principle may be made where the 
reduction in remuneration is across the board, non-discriminatory and agreed 
to by the Judges concerned, there would be no adverse implications for 
individual judicial independence, however, institutional independence may 
still be at risk. 
 
 Jurisdictional Issues 
 The Beijing Principles also deal with jurisdictional issues, which is the 
fifth key aspect of the Principles. The Beijing Principles point out that a 
failure to recognise the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts over matters of a 
justiciable nature constitutes a potential threat to the institutional 
independence of the Judiciary.  The benefits of an impartial and independent 
Judiciary are of no value if a matter within the jurisdiction of a court is 
diverted to a specialist tribunal in which none of the hallmarks of impartiality 
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and independence are observed.16  Article 34 of the Beijing Principles asserts 
that the jurisdiction of the highest court in a society should not be limited or 
restricted without the consent of the members of the court.  As Article 33 of 
the Beijing Principles states, the Judiciary should be given exclusive 
authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its 
competence as defined by law. 
 Resources and Finance 
 The sixth key aspect of the Beijing Principles is relevant to the 
resources and finance of the Courts.  One area where there is a potential 
threat to the independence of the Judiciary is in the financing of the work of 
the Courts.  It must be accepted that Parliament is responsible for the 
appropriation of funds to operate the Courts in the same way as for any other 
arm of the government.  The constitutional position in relation to money bills, 
however, gives effective control over the appropriation of funds for the Court 
to the Executive government.  Hence the Judiciary is financially dependent 
on the Executive.  A potential threat to judicial independence is posed by the 
preparation of judicial estimates by anyone not acting under the direction of 
the Judiciary and, by the exercise of control by the Executive over the way in 
which the courts expend the funds granted to them. 
 Obviously, modern court systems must be operated with public funds.  
These can only be raised and appropriated by Parliament.  Someone must 
account to Parliament for the way in which the money is spent.  Under the 
Westminster system there must always be a Minister who has this 
responsibility.  Hence, there cannot be total independence of the Judiciary in 
                                        
16 The Hon Justice R.D. Nicholson, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Can they Co-exist? at p.415 
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the sense of an absence of accountability.  It remains however, the duty of 
Parliament and the Executive to provide adequate financial resources for the 
due administration of justice.   
 A possible way of ensuring judicial independence could be providing 
for a guarantee of judicial autonomy with respect to courts' budgets and staff.  
In Western Australia in 1993, the Independent Commission to Review Public 
Sector Finances, appointed by the incoming Court Government chaired by 
Mr Lesley McCarrey, recommended that the Judiciary should have a separate 
budget allocation and be able to manage the finances of the courts.  It 
recommended that the vote for the law courts be separately identified in the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund estimates and should be determined after 
discussion between the Treasurer and the Chief Justice each year17.  It is a 
matter of some regret that this recommendation was not implemented. 
 In order for the Judiciary to discharge their functions they require two 
particular categories of administrative services.  The first relates to the 
reception, filing, organisation of the documents and legal processes relating 
to any legal proceedings, the management and listing for hearing of the cases 
to be heard, and the recording, processing and implementation of the orders 
and judgments made by the Courts, together with the processing of appeals.  
These services are provided by the staff of the Registry of the Court.  The 
other category comprises the services of those persons who provide direct 
support to the Judges such as their personal staff, including associates, 
research assistants, secretaries and ushers as well as court reporters and 
                                        
17 Report of the Independent Commission to Review Public Sector Finances: Agenda for Reform, Vol 1, 
August 1993, Western Australia at pp55-56 (the "McCarrey Report") 
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librarians.  The extent of control by the Judiciary over both these areas of 
administrative services is a measure of judicial independence.   
 In 1984, Chief Justice King, then Chief Justice of South Australia said, 
"A court should be in a position to command out of its own resources the 
personnel and the physical necessities to carry on its work without reference 
to the executive branch.  So far this has proved to be unattainable, except in 
the case of the High Court of Australia … The best which we have been able 
to achieve is the convention that it is the responsibility of the executive arm of 
government to provide unconditionally the necessary resources for the 
administration of justice and to respect without question the integrity and 
independence of the Judiciary."  In Western Australia, the courts have yet to 
match the South Australian achievement, although the integrity and 
independence of the Judiciary has not been questioned.   
 The prosecution and trial of persons accused of criminal offences is not 
a Government programme which can be cut or expanded dependent upon the 
availability of funds.  It is essential that those who have been charged with 
offences are brought to trial without delay.  The function of the Judiciary to 
preside over and decide the cases brought before the Courts, either by 
criminal prosecutions or civil litigants or by appeals, is likewise not a 
Government programme which can be cut or expanded depending on the 
general availability of funds.  The functions performed by the Courts and the 
services rendered to the community by the Judiciary are both essential and 
independent.  Access to the Courts is a critical aspect of the rule of law.  It 
follows that the obligation of Parliament and the Executive is to provide the 
necessary resources to enable the Judiciary and those who assist them to 
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manage the flow of trials, appeals and other proceedings within the Courts 
without undue delay. 
 Models of administration adopted in various courts impact on the 
independence of the Judiciary.  This issue was discussed at the 7th Conference 
of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific in Manila 1997.  Prior to the 
Conference, I asked the Chief Justices to provide me information on the 
procedures applicable to the appointment of staff, the management and 
allocation of matters before the Court and the setting of budgets.  The 
objective was to obtain an overview of the administrative and financial 
structures of Courts in the Region.  It should be noted that the review was not 
intended to identify and recommend to the Chief Justices the most 
appropriate form of management structure.  To make such a recommendation, 
going beyond the general statements contained in Articles 36 and 37 of the 
Beijing Principles would need to take into account differences in the cultural 
and legal or constitutional histories of each country, in addit ion to the 
resources available to each Court.  Instead, the review was designed to 
provide an opportunity for the Chief Justices to understand the differences 
between the jurisdictions represented at the Conference and to provide 
material to aid future discussion of the methods of ensuring the 
administrative independence of the Judiciary. 
 The section on Appointment and Employment of Administrative 
Personnel dealt with the services involved in the reception, filing, 
organisation of the documents and legal processes relating to any legal 
proceedings, the management and listing for hearing of the cases to be heard 
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and the recording, processing and implementation of the orders and 
Judgements made by the Courts, together with the processing of appeals. 
 In all but three countries' Courts, administrative staff were employed as 
members of the relevant public service agencies.  In the majority of Courts, 
the administrative staff were appointed by a senior administrative officer 
and/or relevant public service agency in accordance with a legislative or other 
formal regime established by the legislature.  While on its face this tends to 
suggest that the Courts have little independence from the legislature or 
executive, it should be noted that in most cases, the appointment of 
administrative staff involved a senior administrative officer within the Court 
and/or an appointment board or commission.  In a large number of Courts, 
the Chief Justice is responsible for the discipline and supervision of 
administrative staff.  For example, the administrative staff of the Subordinate 
Courts of Singapore are selected and appointed by the Public Service 
Commission, which delegates its authority to a Judiciary Personnel Board.  
The Board consists of members of the Judiciary of the Supreme and 
Subordinate Courts in addition to a member of the Public Service Division.  
Following appointment, the administrative staff remain under the supervision 
of the Registrar, subject to the control of the Senior District Judge.  In the 
case of the Supreme Court of Nepal, administrative staff is appointed in a 
similar manner, in conjunction with a Judicial Service Commission and 
remain under the supervision of the Judges of the Court to which they are 
appointed. 
 The position of the Supreme Courts of Pakistan, Japan and the High 
Court of Australia was of particular interest.  In the case of Pakistan, the 
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administrative staff of the superior courts is appointed, remunerated and 
supervised by their respective Courts directly, in the exercise of a 
constitutional guarantee of independence.  The process of appointment is 
governed by Rules of Court.  Once appointed, the junior administrative staff 
remains under the supervision of the Registrar as administrative manager of 
each Court, who is also appointed by the Court. 
 Each Court within the Japanese hierarchy manages the appointment 
and supervision of its staff directly by virtue of a similar constitutional 
guarantee of independence.  In the Supreme Court of Japan, this guarantee is 
carried into effect by virtue of Articles 12 and 13 of the Court Organisation 
Law.18  Article 12 provides that: "In its conduct of judicial administrative 
affairs, the Supreme Court shall act through the deliberations of the Judicial 
Assembly and under general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court."  Article 13 provides that: "The Supreme Court shall have a general 
Secretariat which shall administer the miscellaneous affairs of the Supreme 
Court." 
 By comparison, the High Court of Australia manages its administrative 
staff by virtue of the establishment of an independent management structure 
by legislation.  While the Commonwealth Constitution establishes a Judiciary 
as an independent arm of government, the Constitution is silent in terms of 
the Court's administrative independence.  Members of the administrative staff 
are appointed by the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the Court 
                                        
18 Court Organisation Law, Law No.59, 1947 
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pursuant to the High Court of Australia Act 1979, enacted some 79 years after 
the Commonwealth Constitution.19 
 While the ability of the Judiciary to appoint administrative staff 
independent of interference by the legislature, or, more likely, a Minister or 
other member of the executive is a desirable guarantee of independence, it 
remains and ideal.  I note that in the majority of Courts, the wages and 
salaries of administrative staff are paid either from consolidated revenue, or 
the budget of a government department, following its appropriation from a 
national budget.  While the government continues to meet the financial 
demands of the Court, it is only reasonable to expect that, in the majority of 
cases, they will seek to retain some control over the management of 
administrative staff. 
 In those jurisdictions where the Judiciary has been established as an 
independent organisation, administrative staff are paid by the Court itself.  I 
have already outlined the structure of the Supreme Court of Japan.  In the 
High Court of Australia, the payment of the wages and salaries of 
administrative staff is governed by the High Court of Australia Act.  Section 
37, for example, provides that: "Moneys paid to the High Court shall be 
applied only in payment of any remuneration and allowances payable under 
this Act to any person other than a Justice". 
 Judges in the majority of the Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region have 
personal staff.  The nature of such staff varies widely from the inclusion of 
what could be termed "domestic staff", such as gardeners or housekeepers 
through to the appointment of legally trained research assistants.  In only 
                                        
19 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) 
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50% of those Courts in which personal staff are appointed does the Judge 
appoint the staff member himself or herself.  In most other cases it is the 
Registrar or manager of the Court, or the government department charged 
with responsibility for the Court, that appoints the Judges' personal staff.  In 
terms of independence, this may present a number of difficulties.  For 
example, an inefficient or unsuitable staff member may have a direct impact 
on the efficiency of the Judge, particularly where the Judge relies on that staff 
member for services which he or she cannot perform himself or herself.  In 
Western Australia, appointments of Judges' personal staff are made by the 
Attorney General at the request of the Chief Justice. 
 Another related question is how the independence of personal staff 
members is guaranteed.  For example, where the appointment and conditions 
of a staff member are subject to the control of an individual or agency 
separate from the Judiciary, difficulties may arise if there is a dispute 
between the staff member and that department.  A dispute about the level of 
remuneration is an example.  Such a dispute would have a direct impact on 
the Judge to whom the staff member is appointed.  I note that in all cases, the 
wages or salaries of the Judges' personal staff are ultimately paid from 
consolidated revenue. 
 In a little over one third of the Courts surveyed in the Asia-
Pacific Region, the Judges do not have personal staff. They are, however, 
often assigned additional administrative staff to support and assist them in 
their duties.  In the majority of cases, similar issues to those that I have 
identified in relation to administrative staff would also arise. 
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In some jurisdictions these issues are dealt with by the establishment of 
a distinct administrative structure.  In Japan for example, Judges' personal 
staff are appointed in a similar manner to the balance of the administrative 
staff.  In Hong Kong, the manager of judicial administrative affairs, called the 
Judiciary Administrator, appoints the staff.  In both cases, a "pool" of 
available staff is created from which a Judge is assigned staff. 
It should be noted that, in the majority of those Courts in which 
personal staff are appointed by a body external to the Judiciary, the Judges to 
whom staff are assigned retain supervisory and disciplinary control over their 
day-to-day tasks. 
The procedures adopted for Case Management and Listings in each of 
the Courts, can be dealt with shortly.   Scheduling the sittings of the Court, 
the management of the lists and the assignment of Judges to particular 
matters are generally undertaken under the supervision of, or with the direct 
involvement of, the Chief Judicial Officer in each jurisdiction, a council or 
committee of Judges or the Judge assigned to a particular matter.  In all 
jurisdictions, therefore, this aspect of the administrative management of the 
Courts is under the direct control of the Judiciary.  For example, in the Court 
of Appeal and High Court of New Zealand, the sittings of the Court are 
managed by the Chief Justice, pursuant to the legislation that establishes each 
Court.  Section 60 of the Judicature Act 1908 (NZ) provides that: 
"(1) The Court of Appeal may from time to time appoint 
ordinary or special sittings of the Court, and may from time to time 
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make rules…in respect of the places and times for holding sittings of 
the court…" 
Section 52(1) subss. (a) and (b) of the Judicature Act, dealing with the 
High Court, provides that: 
"(1) Any three or more Judges, of whom the Chief Justice shall 
be one, may from time to time- 
(a) Appoint sittings of the court for the dispatch or civil and 
criminal business; and 
(b) Make for each place where an office of the High Court is 
established, rules respecting the places and times for holding sittings 
of the court, sittings in chambers, the order disposing of business…and 
such other matters." 
In the superior Courts of Japan, all matters are dealt with by the 
Judicial Conference of each court.  I have already outlined the legislative 
provisions that give form to the Conferences in relation to administrative 
staff.  In the Supreme Court of Brunei Darussalam, the sittings of the Court 
and the listing of matters for trial are dealt with by the Registrar in 
conjunction with the Judges and the Chief Justice. 
In those jurisdictions in which the Court will go "on circuit" or sit in 
Regional areas, the Chief Judicial Officer also deals with the listing of 
matters and the designation of a particular Judge to deal with the circuit, 
either alone or in conjunction with the Registrar. 
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It is worth noting also that in all but one of the Courts20, rules of court 
are made either by the Judges in Council or by the chief judicial officer.  In 
some jurisdictions, the rules are subject to disallowance by the executive or 
the legislature.  Although not addressed in the survey, it may be interesting to 
identify the circumstances in which the executive or legislature can and will 
disallow rules made by the Judiciary. 
In the vast majority of Courts, the regimes that apply to the internal 
administration of listings and procedure are largely free from interference by 
the executive or the legislature.  This conclusion is significant.  The removal 
or exclusion of external interference in the assignment of particular Judges to 
particular matters, and the exclusion of interference in settling rules of 
procedure, also serve to remove or exclude bias, or an appearance of bias, 
from the judicial process.  External interference in the judicial process, as 
distinct from the judicial function, will create an apprehension in the mind of 
the community that the Judiciary is merely an administrative organ of the 
legislature or the executive.  This leads into a discussion of the next section 
of the survey, dealing with the administrative structure of the Courts in the 
context of the broader public administration. 
The purpose of the section on Position of the Court Within the Justice 
System was to identify the extent of judicial independence in practice.  There 
were divergent answers given by the Courts on this topic.   
                                        
20  The Supreme Court of the Maldives indicated that the President set rules of court in that 
jurisdiction. 
 The Hon David Malcolm AC 
Chief Justice of Western Australia 
   
 
 
 
10th Conference of Chief Justices  
The Independence of the Judiciary in the Asia-Pacific Region Page 23 
 
 
In Australia, a comprehensive study of forms of Court governance was 
published in 1991.  Entitled Governing Australia's Courts21, it provided a 
summary of the forms by which Australian courts were managed, 
incorporating methods of selecting staff and settling budgets.  In that report, 
three models of Court governance were utilised to compare and categorise the 
Courts studied:   
· The "traditional model" was used to describe those systems of 
administration in which the management of the Court fell directly 
under the supervision of an administrative officer responsible to a 
member of the executive government, usually the Attorney General.  
Until the late 1980's, most courts in Australia were administered in this 
manner. 
· The "separate department model" was used to denote those systems of 
governance in which the provision of administrative services to the 
Judiciary was administered by a separate department of state that falls 
within the portfolio of a member of the executive.  Management 
responsibilities were shared between the chief judicial officer and a 
senior administrative officer responsible to the department.  By 
reference to administrative services, I mean those services that fall into 
the first category that I outlined earlier. 
· The final model was the "autonomous model" in which the chief 
judicial officer bears the responsibility for the management of both the 
administrative and judicial arms of the Court.  In some cases, the chief 
                                        
21  Church & Sallman, op cit. 
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administrative officer is appointed by the chief judicial officer or by 
government on the nomination of the chief judicial officer22. 
In analysing and comparing the various courts' structures throughout 
the Region, I have utilised these three models.  I acknowledge that the three 
categories are imperfect, as not every model of Court administration utilised 
will fit precisely in one or other of the three categories. 
Only two of the Courts surveyed fell within the traditional model in 
terms of their administrative structure.  In the Supreme Court of the 
Maldives, the administration and management of the Judiciary remains under 
the control of the President's office.  Interestingly, the administration of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria remains under the control of the Attorney General.  
Six of the Courts fell within the "separate department" model.   All of 
the State Supreme Courts of Australia, except for Victoria, fall within this 
model.  The administration in those Courts is managed by departments that 
are structured in a similar manner.  The management of administrative 
services for the Supreme Court of Brunei Darussalam is conducted by the 
Civil Service Department. 
The balance of the Courts surveyed representing the great majority 
conform to the autonomous model.  What is common to many of the Courts 
that have applied this model is that the Judiciary has been constituted as a 
distinct department of government as a means of guaranteeing judicial 
independence.  In that case, a constitutional guarantee of "adjudicatory 
                                        
22  This style is also known as a "centralised" form in the United States; Graham C., "Reshaping the 
Courts: Traditions, Management Theories and Political Realities", in Hays S. & Graham C., 
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independence" has been carried through to create structures for 
"administrative independence". 
Much of the previous sections of the survey carried over into the final 
section on Court Funding and Expenditure.  As I indicated earlier, complete 
administrative independence for the Courts is the ideal.  However, all Courts 
remain dependent on government and, in particular, the legislature for the 
funds to maintain their operations and for the provision of administrative 
services.  In all cases, funds are allocated to the Courts from consolidated 
revenue or from an annual budget settled by the legislature.  In almost all 
cases, Japan being the notable exception, the funds are allocated to the Courts 
by the legislature, as an item in a national or provincial budget, or by a 
member of the executive from funds allocated to his or her portfolio. 
It is notable that in all Courts participating in the survey the budget 
estimate is settled either by, or in conjunction with, the chief judicial officer 
of each jurisdiction.  In many cases, it is the principal or chief registrar of 
each Court that has primary responsibility for settling the budget estimates 
and bears primary responsibility for the administration of the Court's budget.  
This is because the registrar has day to day responsibility for the 
administrative management of the Court's services.  In a number of Courts 
where registrars perform judicial functions these responsibilities rest with an 
Executive Officer or equivalent. 
I have outlined earlier the constitutional position of the Supreme Court 
of Japan.  It is worth revisiting this in the context of budgetary arrangements 
                                                                                                                      
Handbook of Court Administration and Management, (1993), pp. 3 et seq 
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their Court as it provides an example of the most secure method of ensuring 
independence while dependent on the legislature and executive for the 
provision of funds.  Article 83 of the Court Organisation Law provides that 
the amount to be allocated to the Courts, as distinct from any broader justice 
portfolio, is to be independently appropriated by the national budget.  The 
budget estimate for the Japanese Courts is prepared by the Supreme Court 
Secretariat and receives the approval of the Judicial Conference.  Once the 
budget estimate is received by the executive, the opinion of the Supreme 
Court on the estimate is sought23. 
In terms of the final question in this section, an alarming number of 
Courts reported that financial constraints have had an impact on the 
management of the Courts and the judicial function.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Cambodia has acknowledged that lack of funds has 
meant that there has been some difficulty in arranging travel for 
witnesses in criminal trials.  There is also a lack of Judges with 
specialist training and there is little prospect for ongoing professional 
training.  The Supreme Court of Mongolia has abandoned circuit work 
due to a lack of funds to allow judicial officers to travel. 
 In April of 1997 the then Chief Justice of Australia, Brennan CJ, 
announced in the course of opening the 12th South Pacific conference in 
Sydney that the eight Chief Justices of Australia's States and Territories had 
that day released a Declaration of Principles of Judicial Independence 
relating to judicial appointments.  It contains a set of principles adopted by 
the Chief Justices applicable to Australian circumstances.  
                                        
23  Court Organisation Law, Article 18 (2) 
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Coinciding with this public announcement, the Chief Justices 
published the Declaration referring to the Bejing Principles which indicated 
that the Declaration specifically took them into account and said:  
". . . in any state or country, the key to public confidence in the 
Judiciary is its manifest impartiality. 
There is a crucial link between judicial impartiality and the principles 
of judicial independence, understood as a set of protective 
safeguards.  This Declaration of Principles, like the Beijing 
Principles, has as its aim the articulation and promotion of the 
principles of judicial independence." 
The Beijing Principles, by articulating the benchmark principles of 
judicial impartiality and the Rule of Law, have the potential to make a 
substantial contribution to both the social and economic development of the 
Asia-Pacific Region. As the Secretary General of the International 
Commission of Jurists has said: 
"Far from being a luxury for a poor state, a legal structure which is 
quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to carry out the services 
expected of it must be considered one of the necessary components of 
a society and a precondition for its progress."24 
The adoption of the Beijing Principles represented the achievement of 
a remarkable consensus between the Chief Justices of a range of countries - 
from the two countries with the world's largest populations to some of the 
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smallest.  It was also necessary to accommodate the differences between 
those countries within the common law tradition and those within the 
continental or civil law systems.  The common law tradition is reflected in a 
high degree of judicial independence and the absence of a career judicial 
service, with appointments made largely from the ranks of the private 
profession.  The civil law system reflects both a collegiate system and a 
career judicial service undertaken as an alternative to private practice.  There 
are also significant differences in the approach to procedure as between the 
common law adversarial system and the inquisitorial system.  The 
authoritarian traditions of some countries mark them off from those with 
more democratic traditions.  There are numerous variations across a wide 
spectrum, many of which reflect the divergent cultures of the different 
countries in the Region.  The achievement of a consensus on the principles of 
the independence of the Judiciary in the Asia-Pacific Region was a tribute to 
the determination of the Chief Justices to reach agreement on the minimum 
standards necessary to secure judicial independence in their respective 
countries. 
 
Conclusion 
 An up-to-date legal framework administered, interpreted and applied 
by a sufficient number of persons of ability who comprise the Judiciary is as 
much an essential part of the infrastructure of our State as roads, power and 
water supply.  Conditions conducive to judicial independence need to be 
                                                                                                                      
24 Dieng, A The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary: An Overview of Principles 
(1992) at 35. 
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maintained and nurtured.  This will allow Judges the freedom to reach 
decisions determined only by intellect, conscience and an honest and careful 
assessment of the evidence and application of the law.  Hopefully, more 
provision for the guarantee of judicial independence can be made in Western 
Australia by amendment to our State Constitution.  Just over a week ago I 
presented a paper to a Conference on the State Constitution proposing a series 
of amendments required to give constitutional recognition and protection of 
the independence of the Judiciary.  The making of such these amendments 
would bring Western Australia into line with the standards of the 
international community in respect of judicial independence.   
 It is remarkable that a consensus on the standards necessary to ensure 
judicial independence has been reached within the Asia-Pacific given that the 
countries of the Region are very different from one another.  Each society has 
its own history, legal tradition, political system, culture, values and priorities.  
No single mechanism for maintaining an independent Judiciary can be 
transplanted elsewhere without amendment and have the same effectiveness.  
Each jurisdiction must reflect on its existing safeguards and evaluate their 
effectiveness in securing an independent and impartial Judiciary.25  Western 
Australia has benefited greatly from the international discussion and 
agreement about standards of judicial independence in the Asia-Pacific.  It is 
hoped that the countries of the Asia-Pacific will continue to focus their 
attention on the independence of the judiciary and develop policies protecting 
that independence.  This will ensure the maintenance of democracy 
throughout the Region.     
                                        
25 Debeljak, J Judicial Independence: A Collection of Material for the Judicial Conference of Australia, 
February 2003 at 10 
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